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Employee Benefits: ERISA Enhanced Benefit Claims
and the Seventh Amendment: No Common Ground in the
Tenth Circuit - Adams v. Cyprus Amax Minerals
Co.
L Introduction
In Adams v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co.,' the Tenth Circuit reversed a district
court decision denying the defendants' motion to strike the plaintiffs' demand for
a jury trial. The plaintiffs sued under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA) for enhanced severance packages - a benefit package giving
greater monetary and health benefits than an alternative severance package.2 In
deciding the Adams case, the Tenth Circuit joined the vast majority of other
circuits in finding that plaintiffs under ERISA are not entitled to a jury trial.3
This note will analyze whether the right to a jury trial should exist for ERISA
enhanced benefit claims. First, this note will consider the right to a jury trial
under the Seventh Amendment. This note will also examine the history and
purposes of ERISA. Then, this note will analyze the law before the Adams ruling
in light of both Supreme Court and previous Tenth Circuit decisions. Finally, this
note will analyze the Adams court's reasoning and the fallacies therein, predict the
implications of the decision on other ERISA claims, and suggest a better result.
I. Seventh Amendment
The Seventh Amendment states:
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right to a jury trial shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.4
As a result of the "[iln suits at common law"' language, courts have determined
a plaintiffs entitlement to a jury trial based upon whether the claim presented was
1. 149 F.3d 1156 (10th Cir. 1998).
2. In this case, the employer had two severance packages. The plaintiffs felt that upon their firing
they were entitled to the more generous benefits package than they received.
3. See Brett A. Geer, Discharging Employees for Insurance Reasons: Prayers for Relief and the
Right to a Jury Trial Under Section 510 of ERISA, 59 FLA. BJ. 95, 95-96 (1995).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
5. Id.
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legal or equitable in nature at common law.' At common law, legal claims, but
not equitable claims, were determined by a jury.'
The remedy sought by a plaintiff is an important consideration in determining
whether the claim is legal or equitable, and damages are usually a legal
remedy.9 However, seeking monetary damages does not guarantee the right to a
jury trial." For example, damages are equitable if a court characterizes them as
restitutionary." To determine if the damages are restitutionary, courts examine
whether "they would restore the status quo and return the amounts rightfully
belonging to another."'" Even if a court determines that the remedy sought is
restitutionary, and thus equitable in nature, a plaintiff may still be entitled to a
jury trial. A claim involving both legal and equitable issues or a claim where
equitable issues are "incidental" to a legal claim may entitle a plaintiff to a jury
trial. 3
Consequently, courts examine more than whether a legal court would have
heard the claim in 1791." Claims that did not exist in 1791, such as ERISA
claims, make a broader analysis necessary. For statutorily created claims, courts
still focus on the nature of the remedy sought. Courts consider whether a claim
involves "'rights and remedies of the sort traditionally enforced in an action at
law' . . . and not whether those rights have been recast in statutory garb."'6 The
proper characterization of benefits sought under ERISA has been a great source
of debate since the statute's enactment.
III. ERISA
A. History
ERISA was enacted on September 2, 1974.' 7 The stated purpose of the Act is
to "protect interstate commerce and the interests of participants in employee
benefit plans and their beneficiaries, by requiring the disclosure and reporting of
6. See Ann Persi, The Road Less Traveled in the Better Way: New Routes to Jury Trial in ERISA
Section 502(A)(1)(B)Actims, 27 CAL. W. L. REv. 431,435 (1991); Denise Drake Clemow & Lisa Hund
Lattan, ERISA Section 510 Claims: No Right to a Jury Trial Can Be Found, 73 NEB. L. REV. 746, 771
(1994); Michael McCabe, Jr., The Right to a Jury Trial in Benefit Recovery Actions Brought Under
ERISA Section 502(A)(1)(B), 20 U. BALT. L. REv. 479, 482 (1991).
7. See Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local 391 v, Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 564 (1990).
8. See id. at 565; see also McCabe, supra note 6, at 482.
9. See Steeples v. Time Ins. Co., 139 F.R.D. 688, 693 (N,D. Okla. 1991).
10. See Borst v. Chevron Corp., 36 F.3d 1308, 1324 (5th Cir. 1994).'
11. See Pegg v. Gen.-ral Motors Corp., 793 F. Supp. 284, 286 (D. Kan. 1992).
12. Id.
13. See Vicinanzo v. Brunschwig & Fils, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 882, 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
14. See McCabe, supra note 6, at 490; Note, The Right to a Jury Trial in Enforcement Actions
Under Section 502(A)(1)(B) of ERISA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 737, 744 (1983).
15. See Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local 391 v. Terry, 494 US. 558, 567 (1990).
16. Vicinanzo, 739 F. Supp. at 887.
17. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829




financial and other information . . . and by providing for appropriate remedies,
sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts."'" Other objectives of ERISA
include ensuring that workers are informed about their plan and setting standards
for those managing the plan. 9
B. Coverage of Welfare Plans
The motivation behind ERISA was a desire to protect workers from "abuse and
mismanagement in the private pension system,""0 yet the Act grew to have broad
consequences outside of protecting employees."' In addition to retirement
income, ERISA governs another area of employee benefits - the statute covers
pension plans plus other benefits, including disability and accident benefits.' The
Act covers two types of employee benefit plans: welfare plans and pension plans.
ERISA defines a "welfare plan" as "a wide variety of benefit programs ranging
from medical and hospital care to accident, death, disability, and unemployment
benefits."'
C. Enforcement of Rights Under ERISA
Prior to ERISA's enactment, employees had little redress if an employer failed
to provide promised benefits. Employees had difficulty coming up with the
money to battle a wealthy employer and had trouble getting into court. 4 As a
result, employees had difficulty enforcing employee benefit plans.
An employee benefitreform bill was not proposed until 1967.' The result was
ERISA. Although ERISA is detailed, the statute leaves several questions
unanswered, including whether ERISA allows plaintiffs a jury trial. 7 Because
the statute does not specifically address the right to a jury trial, scholars have
debated whether the right is implicit in the statuteU
18. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(2)(b) (1994) (ERISA § 2(b)).
19. See BARBARA J. COLEMAN, PRIMER ON EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SECURITY ACT 7 (4th ed.
1993).
20. Id. at 1.
21. See NEw YORK LAW JOURNAL, LIvING wrH ERISA 3 (1977) ("ERISA started out as a piece
of social labor protective legislation, with concepts akin to the minimum wage law to OSHA, but then
spilled over to have consequences in the tax area.") [hereinafter LIVING WITH ERISA].
22. See Geer, supra note 3, at 95.
23. COLEMAN, supra note 19, at 5.
24. See LIVING wrrH ERISA, supra note 21, at 49.
25. See id.
26. See COLEMAN, supra note 19, at 3.
27. These questions included the scope of ERISA's preemption of state law claims. See Ingersoll-
Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990). Additionally, the standard of review for a plan
administrator's denial of benefits was uncertain. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch. 498 U.S. 101
(1989).
28. See, e.g., Clemow & Lattan, supra note 6, at 759.
1999]
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1. The Statute and the Right to a Jury Trial
ERISA provides a means to enforce rights created under the statute. " Under
the statute, both participants and beneficiaries have the right to sue.' A par-
ticipant can bring an action "to recover benefits due to him under the terms of the
plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to
future benefits under the terms of the plan."3' Because ERISA does not specify
whether a plaintiff suing under the statute is entitled to a jury trial, courts and
scholars have used different analyses to determine whether the right to a jury trial
exists.
2. Basis for Analyzing the Right to. a Jury Trial Under ERISA
Parties contending that plaintiffs have a right to a jury under ERISA have
tended to focus on plaintiffs' rights prior to ERISA's enactment. Before the Act,
an employee's suit to reverse a denial of benefits fell under contract law,32 and
some courts have been persuaded by the analogy to contract law to allow a jury
trial.33 Consequently, courts will examine whether the plaintiffs are seeking the
types of damages recoverable under common law breach of contract claims.'
In determining the existence of a right to a jury trial, courts are often bound by
another principle of ERISA cases: courts examine ERISA in light of its relation-
ship to trust law." Courts using this analysis usually decide against jury trials,
as trust claims have always been equitable.' However, not all critics agree that
trust law is an appropriate analog for ERISA claims.37 Congress has recognized
that trust law may be inadequate to deal with some ERISA claims.3 However,
the statute expressly states that certain provisions of the statute codify trust law
principles as applitd to fiduciaries.39
29. See 29 U.S.C. i 1132(a)(1)(B) (1994) (ERISA § 501(a)(1)(B)).
30. See id.
31. Id.
32. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 112 (1989).
33. See Bersi, supra note 6, at 438 (stating that courts granting the right to a jury trial rely on the
analogy to contract law); George L. Flint, Jr,, ERISA: Jury Trial Mandated for Benefit Claims Action,
25 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 361, 376-77 (1992) (noting the effect of the contract analogy on the right to a jury
trial); McCabe, supra ncte 6, at 487 (asserting that courts focusing on the contractual nature of ERISA
claims take "the analysis, a step further").
34. See Pegg v. General Motors Corp., 793 F.'Supp. 284, 286 (D. Kan. 1992).
35. See Firestone, 498 U.S. at 115.
36. See Bersi, supra note 6, at 445 (listing the relationship to trust law as one reason why courts
deny the right to a jury trial); McCabe, supra note 6, at 485 (discussing the trust law characterization for
ERISA claims); Flint, supra note 33, at 376-77 (analyzing the importance of the "interpretational
approach" on the right" to a jury trial under ERISA).






IV. Law Prior to Adams
The analysis of plaintiffs' rights to jury trials under ERISA has been clouded
by several United States Supreme Court decisions, none of which directly address
the issue.4 The Supreme Court has addressed issues related to an ERISA
plaintiffs right to a jury trial in the following three cases:4' Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Bruch;42 Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon;43 and Mertens v.
Hewitt Associates.m
A. Firestone
In Firestone, the Firestone Company sold its Plastics Division to Occidental
Petroleum Company. The company's employees in that division were rehired by
Occidental; however, some of the employees sought severance benefits claiming
that the sale and subsequent rehiring constituted a reduction in force. The plan
administrator determined that the employees were not entitled to severance
benefits. Several of the employees also requested plan information under ERISA's
disclosure requirements. The plan administrator refused to comply, maintaining
that the employees were no longer "participants" of the plan. The employees sued
Firestone for severance benefits under ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B) and for
damages for failure to comply with the information request under ERISA sections
502(a)(1)(A) and (c)(1)(B).
The United States Supreme Court held that the appropriate standard of review
for the denial of benefits is a de novo standard rather than an arbitrary and
capricious standard.45 The Court reasoned that ERISA claims are analogous to
trust law claims," and under trust law, trustee decisions are examined under the
"arbitrary and capricious" standard only if the trustee has discretion under the
plan.47 As a result, the Court held that de novo review for denial of benefits is
proper unless the trustee was expressly acting with discretion."
As to the jury trial issue, the Court stated in dicta that it was unlikely that
Congress intended for employees to have less protection under the Act than under
pre-ERISA law!' The Supreme Court reasoned that this result would conflict
40. See Clemow & Lattan, supra note 6, at 758.
41. These cases are frequently discussed by both courts and writers. See Clemow & Lattan, supra
note 6, at 763-70 (discussing the Ingersoll (referred to by the authors as McClendon) decision in light
of the Mertens decision); McCabe, supra note 6, at 500-03 (analyzing the Firestone decision as it relates
to the standard of review for benefit denials); Nancy L. Pirkey, The Availability of Jury Trials in ERISA
Section 510 Actions: Expanding the Scope of the Seventh Amendment, 27 VAL. U. L. REv. 139, 153-56
(weighing the effect of Ingersoll and Firestone on ERISA Section 510 claims).
42. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
43. 498 U.S. 133 (1990).
44. 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
45. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115.
46. See id.
47. Id. at 112.
48. See id. at 115; see also McCabe, supra note 6, at 496-97.
49. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 102 ("Adopting Firestone's interpretation [favoring the arbitrary and
1999]
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with "ERISA's stated purpose of 'promot[ing] the interest of employees and their
beneficiaries."'"" The Court also stated that "[g]iven this language and history,
we have held that courts are to develop a federal common law of rights and
obligations under ERISA regulated plans.""'
Relying on the Firestone decision, courts began to speculate that ERISA
guaranteed the right to a jury trial in some cases. One court stated, "recent
decisions of the Supreme Court indicate that there may be a right, at least where
the underlying cause of action is a legal one." 2 At least one author interpreted
the dicta to mean the Court agreed that ERISA claims were analogous to contract
law; 3 however, this result seems unlikely, given that the claim was decided on
trust law principles concerning the standard of review for a trustee's decisions.
While the dicta in Firestone favors the contract law analogy for ERISA claims,
the holding of the case strongly draws on the trust law analogy. As a result, one
commentator recognized the "inherent difficulty in determining which principles
should apply to ElISA."'
B. Ingersoll
In Ingersoll, art employee sued his former employer under state law for
wrongful discharg,-.. The Supreme Court held that the claim was preempted by
ERISA.5 While the Court's holding did not impact the right to a jury trial under
ERISA, a statement made in dicta set off a debate similar to that caused by
Firestone. The Court stated that "there is no basis in [ERISA] section 502(a)'s"
language for limiting ERISA actions to only those which seek 'pension benefits'.
It is clear that the relief requested here [money damages] is well within the power
of the federal courts to provide." 7
Courts and commentators have interpreted this language in various ways and
its meaning has been widely debated."5 Commentators have suggested that the
language was simply an overly expansive explanation of the wide variety of
ERISA remedies available, as opposed to a creation of new remedies.
5
9
However, some courts determined that ERISA allowed damages traditionally legal
in nature, in the form of extracontractual damages, and thus plaintiffs were
capricious standard of review] would afford employees and their beneficiaries less protection than they
received under pre-ERISA cases.. . a result that Congress could not have intended in light of ERISA's
stated purpose of 'prom 3t[ing] the interests of employees and their beneficiaries.'").
50. Id. at 113.
51. Id. at 110.
52. Steeples v. Tire Ins. Co., 139 F.R.D. 688, 691 (N.D. Okla. 1991). But see Adams v. Cyprus
Amax Minerals Co., 149 F.3d 1156, 1160 (10th Cir. 1998) (maintaining that Firestone had no bearing
on whether an ERISA benefit claim was legal or equitable).
53. See Pirkey, supra note 41, at 154.
54. Geer, supra note 3, at 96-97.
55. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 135, 138 (1990).
56. 29 § U.S.C. 1132(a) (1995).
57. Ingersoll, 498 U.S. at 145.
58. See Clemow & Lattan, supra note 6, at 767-69; Pirkey, supra note 41, at 761.




entitled to a jury.'" Other courts were not convinced.6 One court reasoned that




In Mertens, a group of former employees sued their pension plan's actuary for
allegedly inaccurate actuarial assumptions. The plaintiffs contended that the
actuary's inaction led to plan losses. The plaintiffs sought money damages, and
the Supreme Court characterized the money damages sought as legal.63 The
Court stated, "Although they often dance around the word, what petitioners in fact
seek is nothing other than compensatory damages - monetary relief for all the
losses their plan sustained as a result of the alleged breach of fiduciary duties.
Money damages are, of course, the classic form of legal relief."' However, the
Court went on to state that equitable courts had always possessed the right to
provide some legal relief.'
As in Ingersoll, the Mertens Court's dicta increased the debate over the
Supreme Court's view on the right to a jury trial under ERISA." After the
Supreme Court's decision in Mertens, most courts no longer saw Ingersoll and
Firestone as a signal of the Court's approval of the right to a jury trial. 7
None of these three Supreme Court decisions directly addressed the right to a
jury trial under ERISA. However, the Supreme Court's language in each case
served to fuel debate over the right to a jury trial under ERISA. As a result, the
Supreme Court's position on whether ERISA allows jury trial is very unclear. At
least one commentator has noted that it is "foolhardy" to predict how the Supreme
Court will vote based upon similar precedent when the issue has not been
identical." The Tenth Circuit is also convinced that the Supreme Court's silence
is meaningful.69
60. See Growney v. Heinz Co., No. CIV.A.96-2543-KHV, 1997 WL 534463, at *3 (D. Kan. 1997).
61. See Babich v. Unisys Corp., No. Civ.A.92-1473-MLB, 1994 WL 167984, at *4 (D. Kan. 1994).
62. See id. at 8 (citing other courts' reliance on the Ingersoll dicta and holding that no right to a jury
trial existed).
63. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255 (1993).
64. Id.
65. See id. at 256 ("It is true that, at common law, the courts of equity had exclusive jurisdiction
over virtually all actions by beneficiaries for breach of trust... It is also true that money damages were
available in those courts against the trustee... At common law, however, there were many situations -
not limited to those involving enforcement of a trust - in which an equity court could 'establish purely
legal rights and grant legal remedies which would otherwise be beyond the scope of its authority.").
66. See 9th Circuit Decides That Section 510 Claims Do Not Require a Jury Trial, ERISA Litigation
Rep., Feb. 1994, § 510, available in Westlaw, 3 No. I ERISA Litig. Rep. 11, at *11.
67. See Johnson v. Centennial Life Ins. Co., 885 F. Supp. 227, 228 (D. Kan. 1995); see also
Clemow & Lattan, supra note 6, at 769.
68. See 9th Circuit Decides That § 510 Claims Do Not Require a Jury Trial, supra note 66, at * 12.
69. See Adams v. Cyprus Anax Minerals Co., 149 F.3d 1156, 1160 (10th Cir. 1998).
1999]
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D. The Tenth Circuit
Although the Tenth Circuit did not address the issue prior to Adams, several
cases correctly hypothesized what the court's decision would be in the event it did
confront the issue. For example, in Pegg v. General Motors Corp.," the district
court concluded that the Tenth Circuit likely would find that plaintiffs have no
right to a jury trial under ERISA." The district court, in making this conclusion,
relied on the Tenth Circuit's statement that "[w]e do note, however, that at least
two circuits have held that ERISA does not grant litigants a right to a trial by
jury."' Another court made the same prediction after Ingersoll."
E. District Court Decisions from the Tenth Circuit
Prior to Adams, Oklahoma had precedent allowing a jury trial under ERISA.
In Steeples v. Time Insurance Co.,74 the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Oklahoma held that an ERISA plaintiff who sought medical
benefits was entitled to a jury trial." The court reasoned that the case was
analogous to a breach of contract claim and therefore, the court concluded that
a jury trial was necessary.76 Adams, however, effectively overruled Steeples.
Other district courts within the Tenth Circuit denied the right to a jury trial
under ERISA. In Pegg, the plaintiff sued for backpay and benefits under a
retirement plan." The Pegg court reasoned that the plaintiff was seeking
participation in a plan and the benefits accompanying participation." As a result,
the court concludedl that the claim was equitable." Consequently, an ERISA
plaintiffs right to a jury trial in the Tenth Circuit depended on the district.
V. Adams v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co.
A. The Facts
The plaintiffs in Adams were thirty-nine employees of Amax's Research and
Development Center in Golden, Colorado, a subsidiary of Amax, Inc. Amax
merged with Cyprus Minerals Company, and as a result of the merger, the
plaintiffs' positions were terminated.
Amax, Inc. had a corporate separation policy for corporate employees and the
terminated employees sought to receive severance benefits under this plan.
Although the plaintiffs received some severance benefits, these benefits were less
70. 793 F. Supp. 284 (D. Kan. 1992).
71. See iU. at 285.
72. Babich v. Unisys Corp., No. Civ.A.92-1473-MLB, 1994 WL 167984, at *7 (D. Kan. 1994).
73. See Growney v. Heinz Co., 1997 WL 534463, at *2 (D. Kan. 1997).
74. 139 F.R.D. 688 (N.D. Okla. 1991).
75. See id. at 694.
76. See id. at 693-94.
77. See Pegg v. General Motors Corp., 793 F. Supp. 284, 285 (D. Kan. 1992).





than they would have received under the corporate employee plan (the Corporate
Plan). Because the employees would receive more under the Corporate Plan, this
plan was the Enhanced Severance Plan. Under the Corporate Plan, employees
were entitled to enhanced severance benefits in the event of a firing; the benefits
were available even if a change in company control led to the firing. The
Corporate Plan, however, provided that it covered only "corporate employees,"
defined as "personnel of the Company at the Company's corporate headquarters
other than Corporate Officers." Accordingly, the terminated employees contended
that they worked at "corporate headquarters" and therefore were corporate
employees entitled to the Corporate Plan's benefits.
The terminated employees sued Cyprus Amax and Helen M. Feeney, the
administrator of the Plan. They sought recovery of benefits, damages for breach
of fiduciary duty, and monetary recovery. Additionally, the plaintiffs sought to
recover civil penalties from Feeney pursuant to ERISA sections 502(a)(1)(A) and
502(c). This claim was based on Feeney's failure to respond to a letter from the
Human Resources Manager for Amax Research and Development, Inc., the
subsidiary employing the plaintiffs.80
Additionally, the plaintiffs demanded a jury trial. The defendants denied that
the plaintiffs were entitled to the enhanced severance package."' According to the
defendants, the plaintiffs had no Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial because
the claim was equitable. The plaintiffs withdrew their jury demand for the claims
against Feeney."2 The claim against her as plan administrator was specifically
left to the "court's discretion" under tRISA section 502(c). 3 However, the
plaintiffs contended that they still were entitled to a jury trial on the other
claims.' According to the plaintiffs, these claims were analogous to breach of
contract claims." Based on prior case law, if a court accepted the analogy to
breach of contract claims, the plaintiffs would be entitled to a jury trial. 6
B. Procedural History
Initially, the district court refused to grant summary judgment for Feeney.
Cyprus Amax filed a motion to strike the plaintiffs' demand for jury trial on the
remaining claims; however, the district court held that the plaintiffs were entitled
to a jury trial.87 According to the district court, Firestone signaled Supreme
Court approval of the right to a jury trial under ERISA and that courts should
maintain pre-ERISA rights under the Act."x
80. See Adams v. Cyprus Amax Mineral Co., 927 F. Supp. 1407, 1408 (D. Colo. 1996), rev'd, 149
F.3d 1156 (10th Cir. 1998).





86. See Vicinanzo v. Brunschwig & Fils, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 882, 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
87. See Adams v. Cyprus Amax Mineral Co., 954 F. Supp. 1470, 1477 (D. Colo. 1997), rev'd, 149
F.3d 1156 (10th Cir. 1998).
88. See id. at 1473 ("The clear message conveyed in Firestone was that the Supreme Court sees
1999]
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The district court adopted a two-part test to determine whether the plaintiffs
were entitled to a jury trial - a test endorsed by the Supreme Court in Chauf-
feurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry." Although the test was used
prior to Terry, the Adams district court specifically relied on the Terry lan-
guage." The first step of Terry requires examining the nature of the issues
involved to see if the issue would have been a legal or equitable claim in the
eighteenth century."' The second step requires courts to determine whether the
nature of the remedy sought is legal or equitable.' The second step carries
greater weight than the first.93
For the first branch of the Terry test, the district court characterized the claim
as similar to a breach of contract claim, reasoning that the issue was the plaintiffs'
eligibility under a specific plan." To determine eligibility, a court would have
to examine the parties' intentions and previous application of the Plan. 5
For the second branch of the Terry test, the district court determined that the
benefits sought were "fairly certain of ascertainment."" The district court
concluded that the primary relief sought was money damages.97 The court further
determined that the relief was not restitutionary or incidental to injunctive
relief." Accordingly, the court concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled to a
jury trial on their first five claims." In response, the defendants filed an
interlocutory appeal."w
C. The Adams Court Decision
The Tenth Circtit reviewed the district court's decision de novo. "" The court
rejected the analogy to a breach of contract claim, finding, contrary to the district
court, the plaintiffs' claims more analogous to a trust claim." As such, the court
concluded that under the first step of Terry the claim was equitable in nature."'
This analysis was used even for the claim relating to money damages." 4 Accor-
ERISA as maintaining the protection formerly afforded plan participants and beneficiaries, rather than
their existing rights.").
89. 494 U.S. 558, 565 (1990).
90. See Adams v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., 149 F.3d 1156, 1159 (10th Cir. 1998).
91. See Terry, 494 U.S. at 565.
92. See id.
93. See id
94. See Adams v. Cyrpus Amax Mineral Co., 954 F. Supp. 1470, 1476 (D. Colo. 1997).
95. See id.




100. See Adams v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., 149 F.3d 1156, 1157 (10th Cir. 1998).
101. See id. at 115:3.






ding to the court, the threshold issue was the plaintiffs' eligibility under the
plan,"u leading the court to determine that the claim was equitable.'"
For the second branch of Terry, the Tenth Circuit noted the "restitutionary" and
"incidental to injunctive relief' exceptions to the rule that money damages are
legal in nature."l According to the court, the focus was not on the ultimate
remedy sought by the plaintiffs, but instead, the focus should be on the eligibility
determination.' The court reasoned that unless the plaintiffs were eligible
under the plan, the remedy they sought was unavailable."l This reasoning led
the court to conclude that the plaintiffs' suit for money damages was "inextricably
intertwined with equitable relief.""..
The Tenth Court also considered the damages sought as restitutionary in
nature."' The court reasoned that the damages would be "taking from the
defendant and restoring to the plaintiff something to which the plaintiff is
entitled.""' Based upon these two conclusions, the court found that the plaintiffs
were not entitled to a jury trial.
13
VI. Analysis of the Adams Decision
According to the Tenth Circuit's analysis, the issue was eligibility for
benefits."" Similar reasoning had been used by other courts and criticized as
ignoring the remedy sought"5 and the relationship of benefit claims to breach
of contract.""
Additionally, every ERISA case concerns whether a plaintiff is covered under
an ERISA plan. Thus, according to the Tenth Circuit's reasoning, no ERISA
plaintiffs are entitled to a jury trial. This overly broad analysis clashes with the
analysis the Supreme Court outlined in Terry. The Adams reasoning also is
contrary to holdings of several courts, particularly courts reasoning that suits to
enforce ERISA plans are contractual in nature - decisions which entitle plaintiffs
to a jury trial."
7
The Adams court's reasoning is also contrary to that used by the district court.
According to the district court, although the overall claim is equitable, the right











115. See Geer, supra note 3, at 96.
116. See id.
117. See, e.g., Steeples v. Time Ins. Co., 139 F.R.D. 688, 693 (N.D. Okla. 1991).
118. See Adams v. Cyprus Amax Mineral Co., 954 F. Supp. 1470, 1477 (D. Colo. 1997), rev'd, 149
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the Supreme Court':3 views expressed in Terry. Terry directed courts to look at
the specific claims involved." '
The Tenth Circuit's reasoning that eligibility was the crux of the case was
unusual in that most courts denying the right to a jury trial have viewed ERISA
damages as restitutionary in nature 2" or have focused on what the plaintiffs
ultimately hope to recover.' The Tenth Circuit felt the primary focus was
whether the plaintiffs had a right to recover.12 This approach does not conform
to the Supreme Court's analysis outlined in Terry; however, the approach is
similar to that used by the court in Pegg."
Under the Tenth Circuit's reasoning, every ERISA claim is equitable. A party
has standing to sue under ERISA only if he is a participant or beneficiary.
Thus, whether a party is a participant in the plan sought to be enforced is a
threshold issue in every case. An analogous claim could be made that the claims
are legal. Under bre-ach of contract claims, privity to a contract is a threshold
issue. ERISA eligibility issues are more comparable to breach of contract claims
than to trust claims because both ERISA and contract claims depend upon a
determination of whether a plaintiff is a party either to the pension plan or
contract. Additionally, the eligibility issue depends on interpretation of the Plan's
terms and therefore, is similar to a breach of contract claim.
The Supreme Court provided some guidance on the eligibility issue in
Firestone. Under EFISA, participants and beneficiaries are two of the parties with
the power to bring enforcement actions.'" The Court defined participants as
"employees in, or reasonably expected to be in, currently covered employment.
or former employees who 'have ... a reasonable expectation of returning to
covered employment' or who have 'a colorable claim' to vested benefits."" '
According to the Firestone court, plaintiffs are eligible for benefits if they have
either a colorable claim that they will prevail or if they will meet the eligibility
requirements in the future.' In the Adams case, the plaintiffs had a credible
claim to benefits; they met one of the requirements to receiving a severance
package - they were fired. The main issue in the case was the interpretation of
"corporate headquarters employees." If the employees were determined to be
corporate employees, they were entitled to benefits under the Enhanced Severance
Package. If not, the employees already had received the proper amount of
benefits.
F.3d 1156 (10th Cir. 1998).
119. See Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 570 (1990).
120. See Babich v. Unisys Corp., No. Civ.A.92-1473-MLB, 1994 WL 167984, at *8 (D. Kan. 1994).
121. See id.; see also Borst v. Chevron Corp., 36 F.3d 1308, 1324 (5th Cir. 1994).
122. See Adams v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., 149 F.3d 1156, 1161-62 (10th Cir. 1998).
123. See Pegg v. General Motors Corp., 793 F. Supp. 284, 285, 287 (D. Kan. 1992).
124. See 29 U.S.C. § l132(a)(1)(B) (1994).
125. See id.





The plaintiffs had a credible argument that a court could find in their favor:
they could have argued that the human resources manager felt that they were
entitled to the plan. Presumably, she was in a position to know about Amax's
employee benefits programs and if she thought the employees were corporate
headquarter employees, a court could have determined that the employees should
prevail in a suit. Consequently, the Court's reliance on the eligibility issue is
strained. A more reasoned approach would have involved a detailed application
of the Terry test and consideration of whether the remedy sought fit into one of
the two exceptions.
VII. Proposed Analysis
No matter how great the debate on whether ERISA allows jury trials, there is
one matter upon which most courts and scholars agree: the appropriate test for
the right to a jury trial is the one used in Terry.'" Almost all cases examining
this issue after Terry have used the following test: first, is the claim legal or
equitable,' and second, what remedy are the plaintiffs seeking?"" The
problem is that the application of the Terry test does not guarantee the same result
in every case.
The result under the Terry test depends on how broadly or narrowly the issue
is phrased. A court may characterize the issue as whether plaintiffs who sue for
relief under ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B)"3 are entitled to a jury trial. This broad
characterization leads courts to examine all ERISA decisions on the right to a jury
trial, and the overwhelming majority of cases hold that the right to a jury trial
does not exist.' A large number of cases deal with damages for breach of
fiduciary relationship claims, and a jury trial is rarely granted in these cases.'33
Looking at all ERISA cases together, it would be hard to justify a decision that
plaintiffs are entitled to a jury trial.
Conversely, if a court defines the issue more narrowly, it is more likely to find
that the right to a jury trial exists. For example, a court could define the issue as
whether plaintiffs seeking benefits in the form of money damages are entitled to
a jury trial. This characterization is more likely to lead to comparison with
128. See Pegg v. General Motors Corp., 793 F. Supp. 284, 286-87 (D. Kan. 1992) (finding that a
plaintiff in a suit to recover retirement benefits had no right to a jury trial); Weber v. Jacobs Mfg., 751
F. Supp. 21, 25-26 (D. Conn. 1990) (relying on Terry to hold that plaintiffs were entitled to a jury trial
on legal claims); see also Clemow & Lattan, supra note 6, at 771-72 (applying the test to ERISA Section
510 claims and concluding that plaintiffs suing for interference with ERISA rights were not entitled to
ajury trial); Flint, supra note 33, at 410-17 (analogizing ERISA benefit claims to insurance law); Pirkey,
supra note 41, at 163-76 (using the same test for the same type of claim as Clemow and Lattan but
arguing that the right to a jury trial exists); Note, supra note 14, at 748-56 (applying the test before the
Supreme Court used it in Terry).
129. See Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 (1990).
130. See id.
131. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1994).
132. See Geer, supra note 3, at 95-96.
133. See 9th Circuit Decides That § 510 Claims do not Require a Jury Trial, supra note 66, at 12.
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contract law. There is precedent on similar claims allowing the right to a jury
trial." This analysis appears similar to that used by the district court in
rendering the decision in Adams.
The Tenth Circuit adopted a broad test for the claim, The court considered the
issue to be whether "the Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution
entitle[s] Plaintiffs to a jury trial on claims to recover enhanced severance plan
benefits under 29 U.S.C. § l132(a)(1)(B) ... ?"" The court did consider the
claims separately in a cursory fashion. The court found that all of the claims
related to determining whether the plaintiffs were beneficiaries of the plan.' 6
Based on this finding, the court determined that all of the plaintiffs' claims were
equitable in nature.
However, the fact that one of the claims presented is almost uniformly
considered equitable does not mean that all of the claims are equitable."' "The
right to a jury trial is not lost where legal and equitable issues are presented in
a single case or where legal issues are 'incidental' to equitable issues."'36 Legal
claims do not become equitable because they are brought in a traditionally
equitable court."9
The Terry test focuses on the issues independently, not on the overall nature
of the suit." If tha Tenth Circuit had concluded that some of the claims were
equitable and some were legal, the court should have bifurcated the trial or tried
the cases jointly, The joint trial can be done with the jury hearing all claims and
issuing a final verdict on the legal issues and an advisory verdict on the equitable
issues.'4' Consequently, the Tenth Circuit had a means to enforce a split ruling
on the right to a jury trial. This approach would have been consistent with the
broad scope of the geenth Amendment.
However, the Tenth Circuit seemed to decide that one claim was equitable and
therefore, all the claims were equitable. A more comprehensive approach and
analysis is appropriate in light of Terry's focus on individual claims.'42 As a
result, this note will analyze the breach of fiduciary relationship claim and the
claim for benefits under the Enhanced Plan individually under Terry to determine
whether the right to a jury trial should exist for each.
134. See Steeples v. Times Ins. Co., 139 F.R.D. 688, 694 (N.D. Okla. 1991) (affirming causes of
action for payment of medical insurance benefits under ERISA are legal, and therefore, plaintiffs have
a constitutional right to a jury trial); Vicinanzo v. Brunschwig & Fils, 739 F. Supp. 882, 885 (S.D.NY.
1990) (reasoning that the right to ajury trial was obvious); Stamps v. Michigan Teamsters Joint Council,
431 F. Supp. 745,747 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (holding that the plaintiff was entitled to a jury trial on a claim
for money damages).
135. Adams v. Cyprus Anmax Minerals Co., 149 F.3d 1156, 1158 (10th Cir. 1998).
136. See id. at 1162.
137. See Vieinanzo, 739 F. Supp. at 887; see also Pirkey, supra note 41, at 175,
138. Id. (quoting Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 473 (1962)).
139. See id. (discussing Ross v. Bernhard, 196 U.S. 531, 538 (1970)).
140. See Chauffeur;, Teamsters and Helpers Local 391 V. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 (1990).
141. See Babich v. Unisys Corp., No. Civ.A.92-1473-MLB, 1994 WL 167984, at *8 (D. Kan. 1994).
142. See Pirkey, supra note 41, at 166 (suggesting that in a suit with more than one claim, the




A. The Breach of Fiduciary Relationship Claim
ERISA section 404"'4 spells out the duties required of an ERISA plan
fiduciary, and section 406'" prohibits fiduciaries from participating in certain
transactions. In Adams, the plaintiffs maintained that the defendants breached
these statutory duties. Congress provided a civil enforcement provision for these
statutes in ERISA section 502(a)(1).1
4
1
Applying the Terry test to the plaintiffs' claims, the first issue is whether the
claim would have been heard by a legal or equitable court in the 1800s. Like the
claim in Terry, ERISA claims did not exist in the eighteenth century.'"
However, a plaintiff still may be entitled to a jury trial under Terry. The Supreme
Court has actively preserved the right to a jury trial for legal issues.'47 The
Supreme Court rationalizes its vigilance by stating that "[m]aintenance of the jury
as a fact-finding body is of such importance and occupies so firm a place in our
history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial
should be scrutinized with the utmost care."'1"
This careful scrutiny requires looking for an analogous action from the
eighteenth century.' 9 Most courts which have examined this issue for breach of
fiduciary relationship claims have found a trust action to be analogous to ERISA
claims." As trust claims were equitable at common law, an ERISA plaintiff
would not have the right to a jury trial under the first branch of the Terry test.
The second branch, however, is of greater importance.''
Under the second branch of the Terry test, a court examines the nature of the
remedy sought."' In Adams, the plaintiffs sought the same damages for all five
of their claims against Amax. These damages included benefits due under the
severance plan, prejudgement interest, attorneys' fees, costs, and other equitable
relief. Given the plaintiffs' desires for a jury trial, the request for equitable
relief seems ill-conceived. However, whether the other benefits sought are legal
or equitable is at least debatable.
Other cases examining breach of fiduciary relationship claims have denied the
right to a jury trial.'" One court reasoned that the claim must be examined
143. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(1994).
144. Id. § 1106.
145. Id. § 1132.
146. The claim was for a union's alleged breach of duty of fair representation. See Terry, 494 U.S.
at 561.
147. See id. at 565.
148. Id. (quoting Dimick v. Scheidt, 293 US, 474, 486 (1935)).
149. See id.
150. See Pirkey, supra note 41, at 166.
151. See icL
152. See id.
153. See Adams v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., 149 F.3d 1156, 1161 (10th Cir. 1998).
154. See 9th Circuit Decides That Section 510 Claims Do Not Require a Jury Trial, supra note 66,
at 12.
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under trust law, and consequently, a jury trial was inappropriate." However,
other courts have compared breach of fiduciary relationship claims to traditionally
equitable retaliatory discharge claims.'" This analogy weighs towards granting
jury trials. However, courts have held that the second branch of the Terry test
weighs strongly against granting jury trials for breach of fiduciary relationship
claims.'"
In light of Terry, the Tenth Circuit still could have found that the plaintiffs
were entitled to a jury trial. The court should have reasoned the plaintiffs
primarily were seeking their benefits under the enhanced severance package and
money damages for the alleged breach. This analysis could be enough to show
that the remedies sought are equitable; however, this result seems unlikely given
the number of jurisdictions reaching a contrary holding.
The weight of precedent from other circuits may justify the Adams court's
refusal to grant a jury trial on the breach of fiduciary relationship claim.
Nonetheless, the analysis is not as clear cut for the other claims presented.
B. Recovery of Plan Benefits and Money Damages
The plaintiffs in Adams sought recovery of benefits under ERISA section
502(a)(1)(B). This provision provides that "[a] civil action may be brought - by
a participant or beneficiary -... to recover benefits due to him under the terms
of his plan, to enforce his rights under terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights
to future benefit under the terms of the plan.'"" The plaintiffs in Adams
maintained that because they were seeking money damages, they were entitled to
a jury trial. The Tenth Circuit disagreed.
Under the first step of Terry, the initial question concerns the nature of the
issues involved. In Adams, the question was whether recovery of benefits is a
legal or equitable issue. There is no definite answer to this question; however,
several cases have held that plaintiffs suing for recovery of benefits are entitled
to a jury trial.' 9
Some courts' decisions provide a well-reasoned basis for the position that
recovery of benefits is legal relief. In the Adams case, the plaintiffs contended
that they were entitled to the enhanced severance package and the company failed
to provide the benefits. This claim is factually similar to cases in which
employees have sued to regain medical benefits under employer-provided
155. See Ershick v. Greb X-Ray Co., No. Civ.A.87-2362-S, 1987 WL 208887, at *2 (D. Kan. 1994).
156. See 9th Circuit Decides that Section 510 Claims Do Not Require a Jury Trial, supra note 66,
at 11.
157. See id. at 12.
158. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(l)(B) (1994).
159. See Steeples v. Time Ins. Co., 139 F.R.D. 688, 694 (N.D. Okla. 1991) (affirming causes of
action for payment of medical insurance benefits under ERISA are legal and therefore, plaintiffs have
a constitutional right to a jury trial); Vicinanzo v. Brunschwig & Fils, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 882, 885
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (reasoning that right to ajury trial was obvious); Stamps v. Michigan Teamsters Joint
Council, 431 F. Supp. 745, 747 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (holding that the plaintiffs were entitled to a jury trial




insurance. Courts have characterized these cases as similar to breach of contract
claims.' 0 The district court in Adams followed this reasoning finding that the
issue was legal and comparable to a breach of contract claim.6 '
Moreover, this approach conforms with the Supreme Court's dicta in Firestone
which suggested that ERISA never was intended to reduce employees' rights."6 2
Because of ERISA's stated purpose of protecting employee rights," this
approach is credible. It seems unfair that a statute designed to benefit employees
would provide them with less protection than they had prior to ERISA. Before
the statute was enacted, claims for failure to provide promised benefits fell under
breach of contract and were heard by a jury.
The plaintiffs' claim in Adams is analogous to a breach of contract case. The
plaintiffs maintained that they were eligible for the benefits provided to "corporate
headquarters employees." As a result, the case revolves around the determination
of whether the plaintiffs were party to the Corporate Plan. This analysis is the
functional equivalent of determining whether a party is privy to a contract. Under
common law, this would have been a legal issue. As one author noted, there is
a close tie between ERISA "benefits due" claims and contract law."M Commen-
tators have compared lawsuits where the plaintiffs seek funded benefits to
lawsuits concerning insurance contracts." The Supreme Court's holding in
Firestone could be seen as an endorsement of this tie." Consequently, the first
branch of the Terry test favors the right to a jury trial on the claims for benefits
and money damages.
Looking at the second part of the Terry test, the case for a jury trial becomes
even stronger. For this claim, the plaintiffs sought the benefits they would have
received under the enhanced severance package. This translates into more money
and more health benefits. The Vicinanzo v. Brunschwig & Fils7 and Steeples
decisions involved actions to recover the medical benefits that employees alleged
their employers failed to provide as promised. The decisions are factually similar
to Adams, and in both, the courts determined that the plaintiffs were entitled to
jury trials."
Certainly, the right to a jury trial is not automatic just because a plaintiff seeks
money damages. However, money damages are usually a legal remedy unless
they fit in one of the two Terry exceptions. The first exception is present where
160. See also Flint, supra note 33, at 413; supra note 159.
161. See Adams v. Cyprus Amax Mineral Co., 954 F. Supp. 1470, 1476 (D. Colo. 1997), rev'd. 149
F.3d 1156 (10th Cir. 1998).
162. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 102 (1989).
163. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1994).
164. Geer, supra note 3. at 96.
165. See Flint, supra note 33, at 410-13.
166. See id
167. 739 F. Supp. 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
168. See Steeples v. Time Ins. Co., 139 F.R.D. 688, 694 (N.D. Okla. 1991); Vicinanzo v.
Brunschwig & Fils, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 882, 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
1999]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1999
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
the money damages are restitutionary in nature.'" The second exception applies
when money damages are incidental to injunctive relief.'
In Adams, the main remedies sought by the plaintiffs were money damages and
greater severance pay. Both types of relief would be considered legal relief unless
one of the two exceptions is present. In Adams, the plaintiffs did not seek
equitable relief such as rescission. Instead, they prayed for money damages and
the benefits available under the enhanced severance package. The damages sought
clearly were not within the second Terry exception. The money and benefits were
not incidental to injunctive relief - the plaintiffs only wanted money and
benefits. Any injunctive relief would be secondary to that remedy.
The only issue remaining is whether the damages sought were restitutionary.
Some courts have held that ERISA damages are restitutionary;17' however, there
is a strong argument that under Terry the damages sought are legal. The plaintiffs
did not seek any type of specific performance nor did they ask the court for
continuing coverage or reinstatement of the enhanced severance package. The
Adams plaintiffs simply sought money damages and severance benefits. These
requests are legal in nature.
The damages sought are not restitutionary for several reasons. First, the
plaintiffs did not seek damages to restore the status quo. The fiduciaries had not
taken participant assets that they would have been required to return. The
participants merely argued that they were eligible for more benefits under the
enhanced severance package. To determine this, a court would have to interpret
the Plan. This interpretation clearly resembles a breach of contract action.
Consequently, the damages sought were not restitutionary. Because the money
damages do not fit within either of the Terry exceptions, they were legal in
nature.
VIII. Conclusion
The Adams plaintiffs sought monetary and health benefits under a severance
plan more generous than the one which their employer awarded. When the
employees sued to obtain the more generous plan under ERISA, the Tenth Circuit
addressed the issue in a case of first impression. According to the Tenth Circuit,
the employees were entitled to benefits only if they were participants in the plan.
The court characterized the issue as equitable and accordingly, held that the
plaintiffs were not entitled to a jury trial.
The Tenth Circuit's holding followed that of the other circuit courts who have
addressed the issue. However, the holding effectively overruled a prior United
States District Court case from Oklahoma allowing jury trials under ERISA. The
court's reasoning as to the eligibility issue was unique, even among courts
denying the right to a jury trial.
169. See Pegg v. General Motors Corp., 793 F. Supp. 284, 286 (D. Kan. 1992).
170. See Adams v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., 149 F.3d 1156, 1161 (10th Cir. 1998).




According to the Terry test, the plaintiffs should have received a jury trial.
Their claim was analogous to a breach of contract claim and the monetary
benefits the plaintiffs sought are traditionally restitutionary. The benefits had
never been awarded to the plaintiffs and consequently, were not restitutionary. As
a result, the plaintiffs fell within the traditional definition of legal damages.
Consequently, the plaintiffs should have received a jury trial. This result would
comply with the Seventh Amendment and the Supreme Court's view of the
importance of the jury.
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